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MUCH ADO ABOUT THE MEANING OF
"BENEFIT ACCRUAL": THE ISSUE OF AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN HYBRID CASH
BALANCE PLAN QUALIFICATION IS
DYING BUT NOT YET DEAD
BARRY KOZAK' AND JOSHUA WALDBESER*"

In the world of qualified retirement plans,1 there are only two
choices for a for-profit employer to deliver retirement benefits to
its employees: through a defined contribution plan,2 or through a
defined benefit plan.3 They look, act (and yes, smell) different, and
the rules in the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C." or "Code") and
ERISA that attach to and govern qualified plans are sometimes
Barry Kozak is the Associate Director of the graduate
Employee
Benefits programs at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, where he
teaches various J.D. and LL.M. classes in employee benefits, income taxation,
elder law, and workplace privacy. Barry is an attorney, an Enrolled Actuary,
a Certified Pension Consultant, and a Chartered Financial Consultant.
Currently, he has begun his post-graduate scholarship and studies at The
University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy. The authors wish to
thank Michael Colonna, who just graduated from The John Marshall Law
School with his J.D. and LL.M. in Employee Benefits, for his research
assistance in this Article.
"" Joshua Waldbeser is a former Retirement Plan
Consultant, licensed
attorney in Illinois, and a LL.M. candidate in Employee Benefits Law at The
John Marshall Law School, currently serving as Research Assistant for
Professors Barry Kozak and Kathryn Kennedy. Mr. Waldbeser completed his
Juris Doctor with honors in 2005, also at The John Marshall Law School, and
served, among other positions, as the Managing Editor of The John Marshall
Law Review and as an extern for United States District Judge Samuel DerYeghiayan.
1. A qualified plan is a retirement plan that meets all of the requirements
of 26 U.S.C. § 401(a), as amended, such that the sponsoring employer will get
an immediate tax deduction for contributions made to the plan under 26
U.S.C. § 404(a), the participants and beneficiaries of the plan will not
generally pay taxes on their retirement benefits until actually received under
26 U.S.C. § 402(a), and since the assets generally need to be invested in a trust
that is tax-exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), no income taxes are paid in the
interim.
2. See basically identical definitions at 26 U.S.C. § 414(i) and § 3(34) of
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), P.L. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
3. See basically identical definitions at 26 U.S.C. § 414(j) and ERISA
§ 3(35).
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quite different for defined contribution plans than for defined
benefit plans. One of those important differences is how Congress
seeks to prevent age discrimination in qualified plans with what
appear to be stricter rules for defined benefit plans than for
defined contribution plans.
A cash balance plan4 is a hybrid plan that has been developed
over time by attorneys, actuaries, accountants, and other benefits
professionals to mimic the individual account aspects of defined
contribution plans while remaining grounded with the guaranteed
component of the defined benefit plan (here, the investment
earnings and the annual contribution credits are usually
guaranteed).' Therefore, since benefits are not based solely on the
accumulation of contributions, forfeitures and fund earnings, the
plan is by definition a defined benefit plan and not a defined
contribution plan.
This cash balance design enjoyed great viability and growth
in the mid 1980s through the mid 1990s in the absence of any
specific rules, and its plan sponsors and administrators attempted
to comply with the qualification rules applicable to all defined
benefit plans. Then the lawsuits began, and some of the loudest
cries were about age discrimination.6 Congress finally endorsed
the cash balance design in the Pension Protection Act of 20067
("PPA") by carving out a special rule that allowed cash balance
plans to meet the age-discrimination requirements, but did so only
on a prospective basis. Around the same time, existing cash
balance plan sponsors found a welcome ally in the influential and
economically savvy Seventh Circuit8 in their defense against age
discrimination claims arising from past events. However, while
the news of late has been generally favorable for the general
concept of a cash balance plan, significant pockets of potential
liability continue to fester. The holding of the Seventh Circuit in
Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan' is limited in application to
4. Before 2006, a common plan design that was a hybrid between a
defined benefit plan and defined contribution plan was referred to as a cash
balance plan. As discussed below, the legal name now assigned is either
"statutory hybrid plan" or "applicable defined benefit plan" (the authors will
use the former term in this Article where appropriate in lieu of cash balance
plan).
5. For a discussion of the various advantages of, and reasons behind the
explosive growth of cash balance plans, see generally Barry Kozak, The Cash
Balance Plan:An Integral Component of the Defined Benefit Plan Renaissance,
37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 753 (2004).
6. As discussed below, class-action plaintiffs concurrently allege age
discrimination violations of both ERISA and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), P.L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.
7. P.L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (Aug. 17, 2006) [hereinafter "PPA"1.
8. Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2006),
cert. Denied 127 S. Ct. 1143 (Jan. 16, 2007).
9. Id.
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its own subordinate jurisdictions, and adoption of its rationale
(and result) by other courts has been a mixed bag - some on
board, some not, some having yet to be heard."0 This Article will
analyze the remaining legal issues, including age-discrimination
claims for cash balance plans in existence before June 29, 2005.
First, this Article will explain how a statutory hybrid plan
with a cash balance design works. Second, this Article will
explore the age-discrimination prohibitions for all defined benefit
plans prior to the PPA, outline the prospective changes made by
the PPA, and then provide a comprehensive analysis of Cooper's
strengths and weaknesses as precedent. Third, this Article will
highlight the non-age discrimination issues remaining unresolved
and still being litigated for older cash balance plans. Finally, this
Article will summarize the advantages and disadvantages of the
cash balance plan design after the changes made by the PPA. The
authors hope that this Article will demonstrate that, going
forward, employers that want to provide retirement benefits
through a qualified plan having the guarantees of a defined
benefit plan but has the look and feel of a defined contribution
plan will be able to accomplish their business goals through a
statutory hybrid plan with a cash balance design.
I.

WHAT IS A HYBRID PLAN?

Even after the amendments made by the PPA, only two
mutually exclusive types of qualified retirement plans exist:
defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans. Before the
PPA (and subsequently Notice 2007-6) provided specific legal
terms, consultants referred to hybrid plan designs combining
attributes of defined contribution and defined benefit plans as
"cash balance plans," "pension equity plans," "defined lump sum
plans," "personal account plans," "life cycle plans," or "cash
account plans." Going forward, however, the actual legal term for
1
any hybrid design is either "applicable defined benefit plan""
or
"statutory hybrid plan."12 For purposes of this Article, they will be
referred to as "statutory hybrid plans." Regardless of the labels
given these hybrid pension plans, however, they are now
absolutely, without question, a subset of defined benefit plans, and
a thorough understanding of a defined benefit plan is required
before advising a client on a hybrid design.13
10. See infra Part II(B).
11. Sections 701(a)(2) and (b)(2) of the PPA adds new sections at ERISA
§ 203(f) and 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(13), respectively.
12. I.R.S. Notice 2007-6, 2007-3 I.R.B. 272.
13. For a more comprehensive discussion of the difference between defined
benefit plans and defined contribution plans, see Barry Kozak, Cash Balance
Plans: Still a Good Program if We Look to the Logic From Eaton and
BankBoston Rather than from IBM, 11 J. OF PENSION BENEFITS 29, 29-36
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A defined contribution plan is an individual account plan
where benefits at retirement are based solely on the accumulation
of contributions, forfeitures, and earnings within the individual
account.' 4 A defined benefit plan is any qualified plan that is not a
defined contribution plan.'5 Therefore, if a plan either does not
have individual accounts, or if it has individual accounts, but the
benefits are not based solely on the accumulation of the account,
then by legal definition the plan is a defined benefit plan,
regardless of how the plan is drafted, administrated, or
communicated.
Common defined contribution plan types include a profit
sharing plan, a money purchase plan, a 401(k) cash or deferred
arrangement, and an employee stock ownership plan.
A
participant in any of these defined contribution plans easily
understands the value of his or her benefits in the plan because
the benefit statement will show the ending account balance as of
the prior valuation date, contributions and forfeitures added to the
account during the current valuation period, and the appreciation
in market value. This easily understood value of benefits at any
time is the key characteristic to a hybrid plan design: employers
can provide a guaranteed defined benefit promise by
communicating it to the employee as an immediate account
instead of an annuity payable at normal retirement age."
In a statutory hybrid plan, the accounts that are created
through the plan design are hypothetical or notional accounts that
are not truly individual accounts, as that term is used for defined
contribution plans. In addition, a guaranteed interest rate is
generally credited to these hypothetical accounts (even if it is a
floating market rate).
Thus, falling outside of the legal
requirement for defined contribution plans that benefits must be
based solely on the accumulation of account. For these reasons,
and because Congress said so through the PPA, statutory hybrid
plans are defined benefit plans and must comply with all of the
rules associated with defined benefit plans described elsewhere in
the Code and in ERISA.
Basically, a statutory hybrid plan established after the
effective date of the PPA expresses the accrued benefit 7 as a
(2004).

14. 26 U.S.C. § 414(i) (emphasis added).
15. 26 U.S.C. § 414(j).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(i) requires an employee's accrued benefit under
a defined benefit plan to be expressed in the form of an annual benefit
commencing at normal retirement; whereas 26 U.S.C. §411(a)(7)(A)(ii)
requires an employee's accrued benefit under a defined contribution plan to be
expressed in the form of the balance of an employee's account (at any point in

time).
17. Under the PPA, the term accrued benefit is still used, but for purposes
of determining the accrued benefit in a statutory hybrid plan, it must be the
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balance in a hypothetical account or as an accumulated percentage
of final average compensation subject to the following rules 8 .
First, in order to comply with the age discrimination rules
(discussed in Part II of this Article), any participant's accrued
benefit must be equal to or greater than any similarly situated
younger person's accrued benefit. 9 Second, the interest crediting
rate cannot be greater than a market rate defined through
regulations°; it could be a guaranteed rate that is equal to the
greater of a fixed or variable rate, but if it is a variable rate, then
upon termination it must equal the average of the rates of returns
for the prior five years. Third, the hypothetical account balance
may not be subject to the minimum lump sum rules for other
defined benefit plans under I.R.C. § 417(e).
Fourth, accrued
benefits must be fully vested within three years of service.
Finally, if a traditional defined benefit plan is converted into a
statutory hybrid plan, then the preserved benefit from the old plan
must be added to all new accruals from the new plan.
II.

PREVENTING AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN QUALIFIED PENSION PLANS

A. GeneralAge DiscriminationRules
All qualified plans must comply with multiple requirements,"
including prohibitions against age discrimination. The drafters of
ERISA adopted different standards (as amended by the OBRA)
for preventing age discrimination in defined contribution plans
and defined benefit plans. In defined contribution plans, the plan
document must contain provisions that allocate any contributions
into the plan among the various participant accounts.
As
described later, this relates to input (i.e., how much money goes
into the respective individual accounts). The level of allocations
(i.e., input) is dictated by the Code as to the maximum annual
addition23 and as to the prohibition against discrimination in favor
benefit accrued to date. In Notice 2007-6, Treasury introduces the term
"accumulated benefit," which is only applicable in statutory hybrid plans and
means the accrued benefit that has been accrued to date.
18. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(5), as amended by the PPA.
19. See infra Part II.
20. Notice 2007-6 provides some safe harbors, pending future guidance.
21. See the list of requirements in 26 U.S.C. § 401(a).
22. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509
(Oct. 21, 1986).
23. Under 26 U.S.C. § 415(c), the maximum total allocation (the sum of all
employer contributions, including elective salary deferrals into a 401(k) plan,
all forfeitures from other participants who terminate employment and who are
not fully vested in their account balances, and any additional employee
contributions) may not exceed $40,000, as adjusted by "Cost of Living
Adjustments" ($45,000 under the 2007 published adjustments).
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of "Highly Compensated Employees" ("HCEs"). 4 Additionally and
of more relevance to this Article, defined contribution plans
comply with the age-discrimination rules as long as "allocations to
the employee's account are not ceased, and the rate at which
amounts are allocated to the employee's account is not reduced,
because of the attainment of any age."25 The terms "allocations"
and "amounts ... allocated to the employee's account" are clear
and deliberate references to the amount of the annual contribution
made to a plan by the employer on an employee's behalf, meaning
that age discrimination testing focuses on the input to the plan or
annual increase in a participant's account balance.
On the other hand, in defined benefit plans, the plan
document must contain provisions that determine the benefits to
be paid upon retirement from the general pool of plan assets. As
described later, this relates to output (i.e., how much money will
be paid from the plan to participants and beneficiaries, regardless
of how the plan's liabilities are funded along the way26 ). The level
of benefit payments (i.e., output) is dictated by the Code as to the
maximum annual distribution 7 and as to the prohibition against
discrimination in favor of HCEs.28 The age-discrimination rules
for defined benefit plans are more complicated than those for
defined contribution plans, and the complexity and ambiguity has
led to the age-discrimination litigation in cash balance plans. For
example, a major difference between the age-discrimination rules
for defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans is that the
former requires a two-prong approach while the latter implements
a single-prong approach.

24. Under 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4), the annual additions for each participant
are divided into their respective annual salaries for an "Allocation Rate," and
the complicated rules under Treasury regulations require the plan to
demonstrate that the allocation rates for the participants classified as HCEs
are not excessively greater than the Allocation Percentages for all of the

remaining non-HCEs.
25. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(2)(A)).

26. 26 U.S.C. § 412 and 29 U.S.C. § 1082 require a mathematician certified
by the Joint Board for the enrollment of actuaries to determine the proper
annual contributions that the sponsoring employers need to deposit.
27. Under 26 U.S.C. § 415(b), the maximum annual benefit (payable in a
life annuity for a person between ages sixty-two and sixty-five with ten years
of credited participation in the plan, and adjusted otherwise) may not exceed
$160,000, as adjusted by "Cost of Living Adjustments" ($180,000 under the
2007 published adjustments).
28. Under 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4), the annual benefits for each participant
are compared to their respective average salaries and are expressed as an
"Accrual Rate," and the complicated rules under Treasury regulations require

the plan to demonstrate that the normal and most valuable accrual rates for
the participants classified as HCEs are not excessively greater than the
Accrual Rates for all of the remaining non-HCEs.
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Although the issue of age discrimination in cash balance
plans involves numerous economic and policy considerations, the
entire controversy hinges on the proper construction of the term
"benefit accrual." And the controversy stems from the following
statutory language. First, the language reads, "accrued benefit
may not decrease [or be reduced] on account of increasing age or
service."'
However,
the
additional
age-discrimination
requirement of the very next subparagraph refers to situations
were "an employee's benefit accrual is ceased, or the rate of an
employee's benefit accrual is reduced, because of the attainment of
any age."" Thus, Congress used different terms in two consecutive
subparagraphs, defined only one of the terms, and used a
subheading that makes understanding the second provision even
more complex.31
Plaintiffs (i.e., disgruntled plan participants that believe they
are being unfairly treated in a cash balance plan design compared
to their similarly situated younger co-workers) and defendants
(i.e., the employers who adopt a cash balance plan design) have
fought over these intersecting terms and meanings for over a
decade now, and although Congress seems to have clarified the
age-discrimination issues after June 29, 2005, the laws as they
existed prior to the enactment of the PPA remain unclear.
In defined benefit plans, the normal retirement benefit is the
"greater of the early retirement benefit under the plan, or the
benefit under the plan commencing at normal retirement age, "32
which is the ultimate benefit promised to the employee if he or she
continues to work for the sponsoring employer until attaining
normal retirement age,33 assuming the plan document is not
amended. At any point in time, if the participant's employment is
terminated or if the plan document is amended, he or she has
earned an accrued benefit that generally may not be reduced by
plan amendment or termination.34 Specifically, an accrued benefit
in a defined benefit plan is "the accrued benefit determined under
the plan and, [subject to some statutory requirements,] expressed

29. See 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(G) (emphasis added); 29 USC § 1054(b)(1)(G))
(emphasis added).
30. 26
U.S.C.
§ 411(b)(1)(H)(i)
(emphasis
added);
29
U.S.C.
§ 1054(b)(1)(H)(i) (emphasis added).
31. The heading of I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H) is "Continued accrual beyond
normal retirement age," but as is discussed in some of the opinions, the
heading may or may not be relevant.
32. 26 U.S.C. §411(a)(9); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(22).
33. Under 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(8), and 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) the normal
retirement age is the earlier of the plan's defined normal retirement date, or
the later of attaining age sixty-five or the 5th anniversary of a participant's
participation in the plan.
34. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(6); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g).
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in the form of annual benefit commencing at normal retirement
age."35
Unfortunately, the parade of legal definitions stops there, and
Congress neglected to provide a definition of "benefit accrual." As
applied to a traditional defined benefit plan, the term "benefit
accrual," and thus, application of the statute, is ostensibly
straightforward. Since, by definition, benefits under such an
arrangement are expressed as guaranteed annuity payments
beginning at retirement age, it is only intuitive that the term
"benefit accrual" would refer to the increases in the amount of
these expected annuity payments that a participant continuously
earns throughout service with her employer.' For example, if the
traditional defined benefit plan document provides a normal
retirement benefit of one percent of a participant's average salary
for each year of service, and a particular participant is expected to
work for twenty-five years until retirement, then his expected
monthly benefit at retirement is twenty-five of his average
monthly salary. However, if he quit or was fired today after only
working for seven years, his accrued benefit today would be seven
percent of his average monthly salary payable as a monthly
annuity starting on his normal retirement date. His accrued
benefit one year from today would be eight percent of his salary.
Therefore, in the absence of a succinct definition of "benefit
accrual," the rate of benefit accrual between this year and next
year is arguably the one percent increase in monthly annuity
benefits payable at retirement.
For defined benefit plans with cash balance designs, however,
this application is more dicey. To understand why, we must first
examine how such a hybrid plan functions. Cash balance plan
designs allocate value to hypothetical participant accounts 37 that
are funded collectively and not actually separated by participant
and are based on a system of credits usually set at an annual
percentage of an employee's pay (i.e. pay credit), with the entire

35. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A). In a defined
contribution plan, the accrued benefit is "the balance of the employee's
account." 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(B).
36. Although there are no statutory provision for determining the rate of
benefit accruals in defined contribution plans, for illustration purposes only,
since the accrued benefit at any point in time is the balance in the individual's
account, it is only intuitive that the rate of benefit accrual, if it ever needed to
be determined, would be the increase in account balance from one
determination period to the next after ignoring changes due solely to fund
earnings.
37. Unlike defined contribution plans where participants have vested rights
in actual individual accounts, the cash balance plan designs a book-keeping
entry and divides the pool of plan assets into hypothetical accounts for
communication purposes only, but participants have vested rights in the total
benefit due to them, and not to these hypothetical accounts.
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"account balance" then being increased by a set annual percentage
(i.e. interest credit). Thus, a participant with annual pay of
$50,000 in her first year of employment and $55,000 in her second
year would be credited with the following benefits in a hybrid plan
with a cash balance design defined as a ten percent pay credit and
five percent interest credit:
Year one: The participant would be credited with ten percent
of her $50,000 salary, or $5,000, as a pay credit. Most cash
balance plan designs provide the pay credits on the last day
of the plan year, so on the last day of her first year as a
participant in the plan, her account balance would be $5,000.
Year two: Her beginning balance of $5,000 would be credited
with one year's worth of interest (whether she actually
continued working for any part of the year), which totals
$5,250. Then, since she is credited with another year of
service, she will receive a pay credit of $5,500 on the last day
of her second year as a plan participant, so her total account
balance on the last day of the second year would be $10,750.
As such, the benefit accrued in any given year by our
participant is expressed as an addition to her balance in the
hypothetical account, as it would be if this was a defined
contribution plan, as opposed to an increase in the size of her
expected annuity payments in retirement, the measuring stick for
age-discrimination assigned to traditional defined benefit plans.
Cash balance plan designs are hybrid, thus, we now see why the
proper definition of "benefit accrual" is the very heart of the issue
of cash balance qualification: courts will necessarily need to go
through layers of statutory construction applications and protocols
to give a definition to a term Congress uses once, and only once,
and does so without indicating what it meant. And, to add even
more complexity, courts, in their statutory construction exercises,
also need to dust off those rules that dictate how to interpret a
statutory provision where the official subheading inserted by
Congress arguably has everything or nothing to do with the actual
provision. It is here that our story of age-discrimination litigation
in cash balance plans begins.
B. The Issue of Age Discriminationin
Cash Balance PlansBefore PPA
Recalling that cash balance arrangements are indeed defined
benefit plans under ERISA, but in many aspects are
communicated as defined contribution plans, the issue of whether
or not they are age discriminatory boils down as follows: if,
because of their similarity to defined contribution plans, they can
be tested for age discrimination like defined contribution plans,
then a cash balance plan will not be disqualified as long as the
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rate of annual additions to participants' hypothetical account
balances do not decrease because of age. On the other hand, if,
despite this similarity, they must be tested as traditional defined
benefit plans where the focus is on the increase in the amount of
expected annuity payments in retirement, then they will fail.3"
Courts have fallen on both sides of this debate, and a further
examination of the underlying law, as well as the interpretative
and policy justifications of the respective courts, follows.
However, it is first useful to address the question of why cash
balance arrangements are doomed to fail age discrimination
testing, if the term "benefit accrual" is defined as an expression of
the increase in value of expected annuity payments. To answer
this question, one need only recall the provision of interest credits
to deduce why this type of arrangement will fail under these
circumstances. If we take two hypothetical participants, differing
in age but not in pay, length of service, or any other variable, in
any given year both will receive the same "pay credit" allocation to
their respective hypothetical accounts. However, when expressed
as the value of an annuity commencing at normal retirement age,
the credit is more valuable to the younger worker because she will
accumulate more interest credits before reaching age sixty-five.
And of course, this dynamic is similarly applicable to an actual
annuity, even outside the guise of a qualified plan: if two people,
differing only in age, both buy an annuity for the same price, and
both are to commence payout at any later date, the future
payments for the younger individual will inevitably be greater
because the issuer will be afforded a greater period of time in
which to accumulate investment returns on the equivalent
purchase price and date.39
Therefore, it becomes clear that the only hope for cash
balance qualification is if the term "benefit accrual" actually refers
to the contribution made by the employer (i.e., the input) and the
plan is thus tested for age discrimination as a defined contribution
plan, rather than as a traditional defined benefit plan. But is this
interpretation correct? The courts responding in the affirmative
have approached the problem from a standpoint of economic logic.
They have reasoned that this type of defined benefit plan was not
contemplated by ERISA's drafters, and because the plans are in
most ways equivalent to a defined contribution plan, they should

38. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Cash Balance Controversy Revisited: Age Discrimination and Fidelity to
Statutory Text, 20 VA. TAX REV. 557 (2001); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash
Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683 (2000) [hereinafter Zelinsky,
Controversy]. Contra Richard C. Shea, Michael J. Francese & Robert S.
Newman, Age Discrimination in Cash Balance Plans: Another View, 19 VA.
TAX REV. 763 (2000).
39. See Zelinsky, Controversy, supra note 38, at 721-22.
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thus be subject only to the type of input-based age discrimination
requirements of analogous defined contribution plans. Conversely,
other courts have shown a more rigid adherence to the black letter
law of ERISA, and, citing policy reasons of their own, they have
refused to permit cash balance plan to be tested in this manner.
C. Litigation of Cash Balance PlanAge-DiscriminationClaims
Several district court decisions, as well as two court of
appeals holdings, have, to varying degrees, endorsed cash balance
arrangements as being non-age discriminatory pursuant to
Chronologically speaking, the first
ERISA's proscriptions.
favorable court of appeals holding, that of the Seventh Circuit in
Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, ° embodies the common
approach taken by the courts that have fallen on this side of the
debate, though the authors feel that the legal justification for the
Cooper holding could have been better developed by the court in its
published opinion.
1.

Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan

On August 7, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ruled that a provision of IBM's defined benefit
cash balance plan that awarded interest credits to participant
accounts did not violate the aforementioned age discrimination
prohibitions of Section 204 of ERISA, 41 and reversed the finding of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois. 2 The appeals court analogized the relevant aspects of
cash balance plans to defined contribution plans, and thus ruled
that, as would be the case in a defined contribution plan, the
inescapable fact that younger workers will accumulate greater
interest over their relatively longer tenures as employeeparticipants does not itself amount to an inherently discriminatory
practice.
The IBM Personal Pension Plan, which was terminated
subsequent to the lower court's unfavorable ruling, had operated
(as typical cash balance arrangements do) to allocate value to
hypothetical participant accounts through a system of pay credits
set at five percent of the employee's gross income and interest
credits set at one percent above the rate paid on one-year Treasury
bills. Such an arrangement, the Seventh Circuit properly noted, is
classified as a defined benefit plan under ERISA because of the
40. Cooper, 457 F.3d 636.
41. Id. at 642. Please note that the ERISA provisions are actually codified
at Title 29 of the United States Code at § 1001-1467; therefore, ERISA § 204
as referenced in the opinion is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1054. See supra notes

29, 30.
42. Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022-23

(S.D. Ill. 2003).
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guaranteed elements of the pay credits and interest credits, but
behaves very much like a defined contribution plan.u
The plaintiff class, consisting of older plan participants,
brought suit against the plan and its sponsor and argued that the
interest credit provision, which had been adopted pursuant to plan
amendments effective July 1, 1999, unlawfully discriminated
against them in favor of younger workers, who would have the
opportunity to accumulate more of these credits over their
relatively longer tenures as employee-participants.
Recalling that the theory on which the plaintiffs brought suit
is undoubtedly correct if the term "accrued benefit" can be defined
only as an expression of an increase in the size of expected annuity
payments commencing at retirement, this litigation can be seen as
a terrific "test case" to illustrate how different courts'
interpretations of the term will govern the respective outcomes.
On one hand, the district court agreed with the plaintiffs' theory,
and granted summary judgment to the class." The district judge,
seeking guidance on the proper construction of the undefined term
"benefit accrual," relied instead on a substitution of the phrase
"accrued benefit," which is defined in ERISA § 3(23)(A) as an
amount "expressed in the form of an annual benefit (i.e., an
annuity) commencing at normal retirement age."45 Predictably, by
transposing the terms and thus defining "benefit accrual" as an
expression of an annuity payable at age sixty-five, (rather than
treating the term as an expression of the annual contribution
made on a participant's behalf) the district court adopted a
framework for discrimination testing that the IBM plan could
never pass. This, once again, is because the value of an expected
annuity commencing at age sixty-five for two otherwise
identically-situated participants differing only in age would
inevitably favor the younger because of the greater period of
interest accrual.
Per the Seventh Circuit, therein lay the error. By replacing
the phrase "accrued benefit" with "benefit accrual" and then
proceeding to apply the prohibitions of § 204(b)(1)(H)(i) using the
substituted term, it held that the lower court had improperly
focused on the measure of the benefit a participant would receive
as an annuity at retirement, rather than on the amount of the
"contribution" allocated to the participant's account by the
employer.' The Seventh Circuit disagreed with this approach and

43. Cooper, 457 F.3d at 637.
44. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1022-23.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(23)(A). Because identical definitions are found in
the Code and in ERISA, it is irrelevant which federal statute is cited by the
court.
46. See Cooper, 457 F.3d at 639 (stating "[tihat's where this litigation went
off the rails: a phrase dealing with inputs was misunderstood to refer to
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opined that a cash balance arrangement should, for the purposes
of non-discrimination compliance, be treated like a defined
contribution plan under the circumstances (i.e., focusing on input
under § 204(b)(2)(A) rather than output under § 204(b)(1)(H)(i)).
In support of this viewpoint, the Seventh Circuit attempted to put
forth both policy and legal justifications.
First, despite the categorization of cash balance arrangements
as defined benefit plans, the court devoted an appreciable portion
of its opinion to demonstrating that these hybrid plans are
functionally equivalent to defined contribution plans in at least all
aspects that the court regarded as relevant. 47 Thus, the court was
able to justify that, by logical extension, sound economic sense
would demand that input-based discrimination testing should be
the appropriate interpretation of the undefined term "benefit
accrual" in a cash balance plan. On this issue, Judge Easterbrook,
writing for the panel, noted that the IBM plan did not cease
making allocations (or accruals) to the plan or reduce the
allocation rate for older participants, and he went on to opine:
The IBM plan does neither of these things and therefore, one
would suppose, complies with the statute. If this were a real,
rather than a phantom, defined-contribution plan, that much
would be taken for granted. Yet if the 5%-plus-interest
formula is non-discriminatory when used in a definedthe
contribution plan, why should it become unlawful because
4
account balances are book entries rather than cash?
Standing alone, this rationalization would justify the court's
ultimate holding in a manner that could be described as shaky at
While it does present a powerful argument why,
best.
economically speaking, a cash balance plan should be subject to
contribution-based age discrimination testing, it is silent on the
legal issue of how ERISA might permit this type of testing for
what is undoubtedly a breed of defined benefit plan.
outputs").
47. The court's first statement with respect to this subject is found in only
the second sentence of the holding, which reads: "It [the IBM Plan] is almost,
but not quite, a defined-contribution plan." Id. at 637. In the very same
paragraph, Judge Easterbrook addresses the fact that, being a defined benefit
plan, there remains risk that the employer will be unable to fully fund all
benefit liabilities, but concludes that "otherwise IBM's plan is economically
identical to a defined-contribution plan funded the same way and invested in a
bond fund that returns 1% above the Treasury rate." Id. The authors assume
that although the analysis on this point in the opinion was modest, that the
court fully understands the minimum funding requirements of all defined
benefit plans, as detailed under 26 U.S.C. §412, in that actuarial losses
experienced when fund assets earn less than the guaranteed interest rate, or
when other funding assumptions are not actually realized, will generate
greater required contribution levels from the sponsoring employer to properly
fund all of the liabilities as they come due.
48. Id. at 638.
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The need for legal justification brings us full-circle back to the
issue of the proper definition of "benefit accrual," on which the
court made its second most important, and most controversial,
conclusion: the term "benefit accrual," with respect to a defined
benefit plan, is analogous to the term "allocation" as it applies to
defined contribution plans, in that they both refer to inputs. More
specifically, the court stated its belief that:
The phrase "benefit accrual" reads most naturally as a reference to
what the employer puts in (either in absolute terms or as a rate of
change), while the defined phrase "accrued benefit" refers to outputs
after compounding. That's where this litigation went off the rails: a
phrase dealing with inputs was misunderstood to refer to outputs.
As long as we think of "benefit accrual" as referring to what the
employer imputes to the account - an understanding reinforced by
the use of the word "allocation" in the subsection addressing
defined-contribution plans - there is no statutory difference
between the treatment of economically equivalent defined-benefit
and defined-contribution plans.49
In further support of its viewpoint that the statutory
provisions applicable to both plan types are one in the same, the
court offered up two inferences, one in the negative and one in the
positive. For the first, Judge Easterbrook pointed out that the
language and legislative history of ERISA's age discrimination
prohibition(s) does not indicate that Congress intended interest
accrual to be cast as a form of age discrimination, branding such
an approach as "not sensible."' This, of course, is a predictable
result, as the drafters of ERISA (as later amended by OBRA)
would likely not have contemplated this possibility, as hybrid
arrangements did not exist, or were at least very uncommon at
that time."

49. Id. at 639.

50. Id. In support of this conclusion, the court cites to the Supreme Court
case of Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993) for the

proposition that "variables correlated with age must be kept 'analytically
distinct' from age when searching for discrimination." Id.
51. ERISA was enacted in 1974, and the first cash balance plans appeared
in 1985. Lyons v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. Salaried Employees Ret. Plan, 221
F.3d 1235, 1238 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000). Bank of America is usually credited with
establishing the first cash balance plan, in 1985. See Kozak, supra note 5, at
760 n.35. Although ERISA did actually sanction a hybrid plan at 26 U.S.C.
§ 414(k) and at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35), its statutory definition is confusing since
such a plan is treated as a defined benefit plan for some purposes, as a defined
contribution for others, and as a bifurcated plan for yet other purposes;
however, there are some statutory provisions, such as age-discrimination,
where the definition itself provides no guidance. Because of the ambiguity in
the only sanctioned hybrid plan under ERISA, it is arguably impossibly for a
court to determine how the drafters of ERISA anticipated compliance with age
discrimination prohibitions by the cash balance plans that were developed
after enactment.
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Second, the court cited proposed Treasury regulations that
would have permitted cash balance plans to calculate benefit
accrual rates as expressing the annual increase in the hypothetical
account balances,52 and, for the purposes of discrimination testing,
then dividing by the applicable participant's compensation.53 With
respect to these, the court stated that "(a)ppropriations riders have
prevented the Treasury from taking final action on the draft
regulations, but they still help to inform our understanding of the
statute. " 4
Armed with this construction of the term "benefit accrual,"
the Seventh Circuit proceeded to hold that the IBM plan was not
unlawfully discriminatory. Because natural interest accumulation
in a defined contribution plan can hardly be construed as
discriminatory against the aged, the court was persuaded that an
interest credit provision in a cash balance plan was sufficiently
analogous to justify the same treatment, regardless of the fact that
it was characterized as a "credit" and allocated to a hypothetical
account, rather than a cash accrual in an actual account. In sum,
the court held that because any disparity in benefits under such a
plan would be attributable to interest accumulation rather than an
"actual" reduction of accrual rate for older workers (i.e., an accrual
rate reduction once a certain age was attained as provided for by
the plan document), this provision was "age neutral" and thus not
inherently age-discriminatory under ERISA.
Of course, this
finding rested upon the court's resolution of the key issue with
respect to this litigation: that the term "benefit accrual"refers to
plan inputs, and as such, cash balance plans may calculate benefit
accrual rates based upon additions to the hypothetical participant
account balances, as opposed to the value of an expected annuity
commencing at normal retirement age.
This decision by the Seventh Circuit, while likely to draw
applause from those who favor this type of plan arrangement as a
52. Id. (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 76123 & 76125 (Dec. 11, 2002)).
53. Id. (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 76126 (Dec. 11, 2002)).
54. Id. For purposes of objectivity, the authors note that the regulations
were withdrawn in a highly political environment.
First, some Senators
indicated that they would only confirm John W. Snow as President Bush's
replacement for Secretary of Treasury if he promised not to finalize, these
regulations if they contradicted the Cooper holding (ironically, prior to his
nomination, Mr. Snow was CEO of CSX Corp. at the time they converted their
traditional defined benefit plan into a cash balance plan design). 'Then,
Congress passed amendments to the Treasury appropriations legislation and
directed Treasury and IRS to stop work on the proposed regulations and
instead to put forward a legislative proposal providing transition relief for
older and longer-service participants affected by cash balance conversions. In
response, Treasury withdrew the proposed regulations and made a legislative
proposal (included in the Administration's FY 2005 and FY 2006 budgets). See
http://www.aarp.org/research/press-center/testimony/cashbalance.html
(last
visited 6/30/07).
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mutually advantageous retirement savings vehicle for both
employers and employees alike, is likely to provoke controversy
and discussion for its seemingly activist approach to statutory
interpretation. Such criticisms, which will be discussed later on,
may certainly have merit. However, it should be noted that the
Seventh Circuit was charged with attempting to construct
Congressional intent with respect to a statute whose key term was
undefined, an unenviable position in that it unavoidably forced the
line between a court's policy considerations and legal
considerations to become grayed. Thus, while Cooper may appear
at first blush to have overstepped traditional judicial bounds,
Judge Easterbrook's common-sense, economic approach was not a
betrayal but a good-faith attempt to give effect to general
Congressional intent with respect to a specific situation it could
not have foreseen. After all, both the district court and the court
of appeals in the case had opined based upon their own respective
reading of the phrase "benefit accrual," and while the Seventh
Circuit's resolution may fly in the face of traditional notions of the
nature of defined benefit plans, it is more than a defensible
position considering the decidedly untraditional circumstances
presented by cash balance arrangements.
Of course, much of the potential dialogue surrounding Cooper
has likely been stifled by the passage of the PPA,55 relevant
provisions of which provide clear legislative endorsement of cash
balance arrangements going forward from June 29, 2005 in
regards to avoiding age discrimination (but not with respect to
litigation commencing prior to this date). All discussion and
discourse aside, Cooper has validated cash balance arrangements
as non-age discriminatory, with respect to both future and
retroactive litigation within the gambit of the Seventh Circuit. It
is noteworthy that two subordinate district courts within the
Seventh Circuit, previous to the appellate court's holding in
Cooper and the almost simultaneous passage of the PPA, had
reached opposite conclusions on the issue of whether such a plan
arrangement
indeed
violated
ERISA
anti-discrimination
provisions."6

55. P.L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
56. Compare Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (holding IBM's cash balance
plan to be age discriminatory, concluding that "like in any defined plan, the
interest credits must be valued as an age 65 annuity. At this point in the
analysis, the result is inevitable. In terms of an age 65 annuity, the interest
credits will always be more valuable for a younger employee as opposed to an
older employee.") with Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (S.D.
Ind. 2000) (holding the opposite). In Eaton the court also noted:
[T]he court does not believe those statutes require that the rate of
benefit accrual be measured solely in terms of change in the value of an
annuity payable at normal retirement age.
Plaintiffs' proposed
interpretation would produce strange results totally at odds with the
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2. Analysis of the Strengths and Weaknesses
of the Cooper Holding
In a nutshell, the Seventh Circuit in Cooper attempted to
establish that no policy justification exists for requiring that
hybrid plan types be subject to the same age discrimination
requirements as traditional defined benefit plans, which measure
benefit levels in terms of expected annuities, justify their legal
conclusion that the term "benefit accrual" is a reference to
contributions or inputs rather than outputs in annuity form. 7 As
stated earlier, the court endeavored to demonstrate the absence of
any such policy justification by establishing that there is no
relevant difference between a cash balance plan and a defined
thus relegating such differences as
contribution plan,'
underfunding and investment performance risk irrelevant. The
authors agree with this conclusion, and like the court, while
acknowledging differences, can identify no persuasive rationale for
why an employer who wishes to provide benefits to employees in
this manner should be prohibited from doing so. However, with
respect to the above-stated legal conclusion upon which Cooper is
underpinned, the Seventh Circuit could have developed its
argument more completely to better advance its position through
precedential guidance.
Recall that the court stated the following with respect to its
belief of the proper construction of the term in question:
The phrase "benefit accrual" reads most naturally as a reference to
what the employer puts in (either in absolute terms or as a rate of
change), while the defined phrase "accrued benefit" refers to outputs
after compounding. That's where this litigation went off the rails: a
phrase dealing with inputs was misunderstood to refer to outputs.

9

This statement, taken at face value, may lead to two
conclusions of gargantuan distinction. The first is that Cooper
stands for the general proposition that all defined benefit plans
are subject only to input-based age discrimination requirements.
If true, this would turn thirty-plus years of ERISA practice on its
head. After all, and returning once more to our discussion of
annuities,6 ° if a traditional defined benefit plan can pass age
discrimination muster by demonstrating only that the
intended goal of the OBRA 1986 pension age discrimination provisions.
57. See Cooper, 457 F.3d at 639. In Cooper the court stated:
Nothing in the language or background of § 204(b)(1)(H)(i) suggests that

Congress set out to legislate against the fact that younger workers have
(statistically) more time left before retirement, and thus a greater
opportunity to earn interest on each year's retirement savings. Treating
the time value of money as a form of discrimination is not sensible.
58. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
59. Cooper, 457 F.3d at 639.
60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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contributions or inputs to the plan are not decreased because of
age, then the size of annuities payable to retirees may permissibly
decrease as the employee gets older and older because the same
amount of money will purchase a less valuable annuity as the
annuity's commencement date draws closer. 1
The court
presumably would not have intended this result, and why this is
clearly an incorrect reading of Cooper will be discussed
momentarily.
Alternatively, the above statement could be taken to mean
that "benefit accrual" does not necessarily denote outputs in
annuity form, and may refer to inputs only with respect to plans
where benefit amounts are defined as dollar amounts rather than
as annuities payable. This second interpretation is certainly the
superior (and we believe, the correct) one, in that it avoids
subjecting hybrid plans to nonsensical age discrimination rules
that were unintended for them without creating a massive
disruption to the status quo of benefits law, and without betraying
the retirement planning expectations of workers. After all, most
employees who are unfamiliar with the legal nuts and bolts of
ERISA would not expect that the rate at which their promised
annuity payments increase may be slowed as they reach their
critical retirement years because the annuity payment size(s) are
the stick by which their expected benefit is measured. Likewise,
the same lay employees probably gauge the increase in their
benefit under a hybrid plan by its respective measuring stick the hypothetical account balance - as they would if it was an
actual defined contribution plan.
Unfortunately, the Cooper holding does not clearly state
which interpretation the court intended. On one hand, the abovecited quotation lends credence to the notion that any defined
benefit plan may satisfy ERISA's age discrimination requirements
through input-based testing. The authors, of course, do not believe
that the Seventh Circuit intended this result. We bring it up here
only to illustrate our belief that the holding, save the court's
reference to the proposed Treasury regulations which were
retracted before consideration of public comments, is simply too
vague on its face leaving many loose ends and thus leaving the
holding vulnerable to attack. We further hypothesize that the
court's failure to state its intention more clearly was its (over?)
reliance on the proposed Treasury regulations.62 The regulations
treat hybrid arrangements and other defined benefit plans
differently by proscribing that "the rate of benefit accrual
under... eligible cash balance plan(s), as defined in these
proposed regulations, is permitted to be determined as the

61. See Zelinsky, Controversy, supra note 38, at 721-22
62. Cooper, 457 F.3d at 639 (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 76123).
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additions to the participant's hypothetical account for the plan
year, except that previously accrued interest credits are not
included in the rate of benefit accrual."'
The general rule for
defined benefit plans, however, remains that these measurements
be performed in terms of the normal benefit payment (annuity)
form.'
As such, the threshold for determining whether input- or
output-based age discrimination testing is required is not always
the plan's categorization (defined benefit v. defined contribution),
but rather, in this limited circumstance, the natural form of the
benefit as it would be understood by a plan participant. Thus, the
authors suggest that it would have been preferable for the Seventh
Circuit to state something similar to the following in place of its
"natural reading" passage:
In accordance with legislative intent with respect to ERISA's age
discrimination prohibitions, we believe that the phrase "benefit
accrual" should be considered a reference to the annual addition to a
participant's benefit as it is communicated to, and understood by,
the participant. Thus, the phrase denotes a reference to inputs in
the case of this type of hybrid arrangement where benefits are
expressed as an account value, and as an increase in the size of
annuity payments in the case of a plan whose benefits are defined in
annuity terms.
Of course, had the above-cited regulations actually been
finalized, this case likely would have been a straight-forward
decision on the merits. Because they were not, however, the court
should have developed and expressed its brief opinion more
thoroughly by establishing from a historical perspective that this
type of plan arrangement was not contemplated when the relevant
ERISA provisions were drafted (the holding, surprisingly, does not
state this anywhere), by crafting its argument more in terms of a
good-faith attempt to discern congressional intent, consistent with
like prior holdings (citations to which were also noticeably
absent),65 and with less emphasis on the court's own economic
viewpoints. On this note, while endorsing the Seventh Circuit's
strong treatment of the policy considerations surrounding cash
balance age discrimination claims, we favor' the later opinion of

63. Proposed Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 76123, 76126 (Dec. 11, 2002).
64. Id.

65. For instance, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York produced a well reasoned holding consistent with the Seventh
Circuit's approach only a couple of weeks before, in Hirt v. EquitableRet. Plan
for Employees, Managers,and Agents, 441 F. Supp. 2d 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

66. In all fairness to the Seventh Circuit, it should be noted that the Third
Circuit had the benefit of utilizing the Cooper holding as a strong precedential
foundation for its own findings.
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the Third Circuit in Register v. PNC FinancialServices Group, Inc.
for its legal treatment, and will discuss this case below.
Finally, the authors question the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
that it did not balance and reconcile the differing interpretations
of the term "benefit accrual" between its two subordinate district
courts' opinions, Onan v. Eaton in the Southern District of Indiana
and Cooper v. IBM in the Southern District of Illinois. In Onan,
District Judge Hamilton determined that for two separate reasons,
as a matter of law, nothing in ERISA, its legislative history, or its
associated public policy concerns requires a cash balance plan to
convert accounts into annuities to test compliance.67 As discussed,
the opposite interpretation was made in Cooper by Chief Judge
Murphy.
The authors question the Seventh Circuit's total
disregard of Onan's analysis of statutory interpretation for
support, even though that case settled after trial and was not
actually on appeal.
3. The Third Circuit Chimes In: Register v. PNC Financial
Services Group, Inc.
On January 30, 2007, the Third Circuit became the second
appellate court to confront this issue head-on.' In affirming the
order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania69 that PNC's conversion from a traditional defined
benefit plan to a cash balance plan did not result in violations of
ERISA's defined benefit anti-age discrimination provision," the
court adopted essentially the same approach as the Seventh
Circuit, but was arguably more successful in justifying its
conclusion by developing its holding in a more legally credible
manner.
To begin, the Third Circuit framed the debate in a subtly
persuasive manner by pointing out, early on:
[T]he classification of cash balance plans as defined benefit plans
triggers a host of regulatory provisions applicable to defined benefit
plans but not to defined contribution plans. Application of the
provisions, however, may be difficult because Congress enacted
ERISA and the administrative agencies adopted the defined benefit
plan regulations before the creation of cash balance plans and thus
before employers such as PNC began converting their extant plans
to cash balance plans. Thus, the original rules for defined benefit
plans simply did not address the unique features and hybrid nature
of cash balance plans.1

67. Eaton, 117 F.Supp.2d at 836 (emphasis added).
68. Register v. PNC Fin. Services Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 56 (3dCir. 2007).
69. Register v. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., No. 04-6097, 2005 WL
3120268 (E.D. Pa., Nov. 21, 2005).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H).

71. Register, 477 F.3d at 63 (emphasis added).
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By setting the stage for discussion within this historical
context, the Third Circuit lent great credibility to its forthcoming
holding as a genuine attempt to give effect to the true legislative
intent behind ERISA's proscriptions, rather than as a treatise on
economic theory.
Along the same lines, a second provision of Register
(beginning at the onset of the holding's analysis section), which is
noticeably absent in Cooper, is the court's reference to and
application of Third Circuit and Supreme Court case law
governing the proper bounds of the courts in interpreting federal
statutory law."2 While a full examination of this topic is beyond
the scope and purpose of this Article, one example that
particularly bears noting is its citation to the recent Third Circuit
case of Alaka v. Attorney General,3 in which the court noted its
72. The court in Register noted:
It is well-settled that "It]he role of the courts in interpreting a statute is
to give effect to Congress's intent." Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d
137, 141 (3d Cir.2001). "When interpreting statutes or regulations, the
first step is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning." Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir.
2005). "Because it is presumed the Congress expresses its intent
through the ordinary meaning of its language, every exercise of
statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the plain
language of the statute." Rosenberg, 274 F.3d at 141. "[Tlhe plain
meaning of statutory language is often illuminated by considering not
only the particular statutory language at issue, but also the structure of
the section in which the key language is found, the design of the statute
as a whole and its object...." Alaka v. Attorney General, 456 F.3d 88,
104 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also King v.
St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 574 (1991) ("a
statute is to be read as a whole ...

since the meaning of statutory

language, plain or not, depends on context"); M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. StateOperated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 348 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that it would be a mistake to "squint[ ] myopically" at the phrase in
question and interpret it in isolation rather than in the context of the
"text and structure" of the statute as a whole). Where the statutory
language, on examination of "the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole" is plain and unambiguous, further inquiry is not required.
Rosenberg, 274 F.3d at 141.
The requirement that "[s]tatutes must be interpreted to receive a
sensible construction, limiting application so as not to lead to injustice
and oppression..." also guides us." Evcco Leasing Corp. v. Ace
Trucking Co., 828 F.2d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 1987). In this light, "[sitatutes
should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable
results whenever possible." American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456
U.S. 63, 71, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1538 (1982).
With these principles in mind, we again set forth the defined benefit
plan anti-discrimination provision at issue ......
477 F.3d at 67 (emphasis added).
73. 456 F.3d 88, 104 (3d Cir. 2006).
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belief that "the plain meaning of statutory language is often
illuminated by considering not only the particular statutory
language at issue, but also the structure of the section in which
the key language is found, the design of the statute as a whole and
its object." 7' Later on in the opinion, the court revisited this
quotation again in support of its statement that, in looking to the
parallel anti-discrimination provision applicable to defined
contribution plans for guidance on the meaning of "benefit accrual"
in the cash balance context, it was not ignoring the statutory
language, but rather gave effect to the spirit and purpose behind
Congress's actions. 75
Because the Third Circuit, in most respects, adopted
essentially the same framework for analyzing this issue as did the
Seventh Circuit, a full examination of Register would be needlessly
duplicative. In short, Register relied heavily on the headship
provided by the courageous Cooper holding, and the above
provisions that we have cited as "improvements" on Cooper are
certainly present in the former case, but there they are more
vaporous and require a more intimate understanding of the
nuances of ERISA practice - the better to "read between the
lines" a bit. Thus, Register is a more complete holding - taking
the best of the form provided by the Seventh Circuit and
enhancing it through delivery in a more palatable form.
4. District CourtDecisions
At present, the Seventh and Third Circuits are the only
appellate courts to have ruled decisively on the issue at hand. It is
noteworthy that in Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A. 6 the First
Circuit offered indications in dicta that cash balance plans may
pass ERISA anti-discrimination muster (the plaintiff in
BankBoston raised antidiscrimination arguments based on the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, but because he failed to
raise an ERISA claim at the district court level, the issue was
waived 77). The First Circuit relied on the same proposed Treasury
Regulations on which the Seventh Circuit relied in Cooper
(although still published in the Federal Register at the time of its
decision) that permitted calculation of benefit accrual rates in the
cash balance context by dividing the annual increase in the
hypothetical account balances by participant compensation."

74. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Register, 477 F.3d at 69.
76. 327 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 10. In Campbell the court noted:
The IRS has also reviewed the challenge to cash balance plans under the
age discrimination provision of ERISA. On December 11, 2002, the IRS
issued proposed regulations which attempt to address, among other
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Likewise, in the 2000 case of Eaton v. Onan Corp., the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
opined that, given an examination of legislative history and social
policy considerations, there was no mandate that cash balance
plans calculate accrual rates based "solely in terms of change in
the value of an annuity payable at normal retirement age."" Much
like its superiors in the Seventh Circuit, the Eaton court went on
to provide a glowing review of the policy merits of measuring
benefit accrual rate according to changes in hypothetical cash
balance accounts, noting:
There is no statutory or public policy reason that the rate of benefit
accrual could not be measured, at least for these purposes, in terms
of the rate of change in the balance of an employee's hypothetical
account. In fact, that measure provides a precise, quantifiable, and
clear measure that does not require any estimates or actuarial
assumptions."'
Citing significantly to BankBoston and Eaton, the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland similarly
endorsed this method of accrual rate calculation and in turn
rejected the plaintiffs claims of age discrimination under ERISA
in Tootle v. ARINC, Inc.82 Similarly, in the days preceding the
Seventh Circuit's pronouncement in Cooper, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York joined the
growing majority of "pro-cash balance plan" courts with its
decision in Hirt,' a decision that employed an admirable and
thorough examination of legislative history, analysis of the above
sister court decisions, and (yes, once again) the notorious proposed
Treasury regulations, on which it offered the following: "Proposed
regulations do not have the force of law. They are entitled to
respect to the extent that they have the power to persuade."' Like
Register, Hirt is a credible opinion both from a policy and legal
point of view.
The growth of the majority, however, has stagnated postCooper. Less than two months after Cooper and Hirt, the southern
district of New York reaffirmed its position in Laurent v.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, which disposed of the age
discrimination issue in essentially the same manner, but the

issues, the proper definition of the rate of benefit accrual for cash
balance plans for purposes of IRS approval of a plan.
Id.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

117 F. Supp. 2d 812 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
Id. at 826.
Id.
222 F.R.D. 88 (D. Md. 2004).
441 F. Supp. 2d 516.
Id. at 547 (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587

(2000)).
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court's last two holdings on the subject took the opposite view.8 5
Since then, at least two other district courts have dismissed cash
balance age discrimination claims on their legal merits.6
Unfortunately, in quite a few jurisdictions, the possibility of
liability arising out of events prior to the effective date of June 29,
2005, for the new cash balance benefit accrual provisions in the
PPA 7 continues to linger. Of course, save an unlikely review by
the Supreme Court,' the issue has been put to rest in the Seventh
Circuit (Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) and the Third Circuit
(Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware). Likewise, it seems
probable that, based on the First Circuit's remarks in
BankBoston,' this court would reach a similar resolution. (The
First
Circuit
encompasses
Maine,
New
Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island).
Apart from these, however, the question remains
unanswered. Naturally, even with respect to other district courts
that have come out on the side of cash balance plans, their
pronouncements are only as good as the next review by their
respective appellate circuit. Furthermore, The United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut denied a motion to
dismiss a claim of cash balance age discrimination in the matter of
Parsons v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan," refusing to reconsider its
1
prior decision in Richards v. FleetBoston Financial Corp."
that
cash balance plans do indeed discriminate on the basis of age.
Coupled with its sister court in the southern district of New York,
the Second Circuit now seems to be a bastion of anti-cash balance
sentiment, subject to an inevitable decision from the Court of

85. See In re J.P. Morgan Cash Balance Litigation, 460 F. Supp. 2d 479, 489
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (pronouncing on Oct. 30, 2006, that the "statutory text" of
ERISA mandates that all defined benefit plans, including cash balance
arrangements, must provide non-discriminatory benefit accruals as measured
by increases in the size of annuity payments); In re Citigroup Pension Plan
ERISA Litigation, 470 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (answering the same

proposition).
86. See Drutis v. Quebecor World (USA), Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 580 (2006)
(granting a defendant employer's motion to dismiss); Finley v. Dun &
Bradstreet Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 485 (D.N.J. 2007) (granting a defendant
employer's motion to dismiss, in part, with respect to age discrimination
claims, including a "wearaway" claim, resulting from the conversion of a
traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance arrangement).
87. See infra Part III.
88. The Supreme Court has already denied certiorari in Cooper v. IBM
PersonalPension Plan, 127 S. Ct. 1143 (2007).
89. See BankBoston, 327 F.3d at 9-10 ("[Clritics of the age discrimination
argument have contended that there are various methods for determining
benefit accrual rates under ERISA, and it is by no means clear that the
annuity method is the only permitted method in this context.").
90. No. 3:06CV552 (JCH), 2006 WL 3826694 (D. Conn. Dec. 26, 2006).
91. 427 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Conn. 2006).
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Appeals there.' In sum, while it is safe to say that the future of
cash balance plans seems bright, the issue of retroactive liability is
still very much alive," as several district courts (with more
possible to come) have refused to deviate from the black letter law
of ERISA and subject these hybrid arrangements to different
requirements than traditional defined benefit plans in the absence
of a Congressional mandate.
III. OTHER LEGAL ISSUES WITH HYBRID PLANS

In addition to participants suing plans for age discrimination
under ERISA, plaintiffs have tried to make other claims against
their employer plans, such as age discrimination under the ADEA,
wearaway, whipsaw, and excessive backloading, among various
other claims.
The PPA settled the first three issues on a
prospective basis only.
Before summarizing the legal issues for each of these claims,
however, it will be beneficial to take a step back and see the forest
through the trees. The existing cases generally represent the
situation where an employer maintained a traditional defined
benefit plan, and where the benefits at retirement were expressed
as an annual benefit. At some point in time (probably in the
1990s), the employer made a business decision to amend the
traditional defined benefit formula into a cash balance-type

92. Hirt is now pending before the Second Circuit (notice of appeal filed
Oct. 13, 2006).
93. All of the above-cited decisions disfavoring cash balance plans state as
the courts' principal reason for so holding their disbelief that Congress
intended the term "benefit accrual" to be a reference to plan inputs. See J.P.
Morgan, 460 F.Supp.2d at 488-89. The court in J.P.Morgan noted:
The fact is that 'accrual,' using its dictionary meaning and in line with
the structure of defined benefit plans, refers to what the employee
accumulates..., whereas "allocation," using its dictionary definition
and in line with the structure of defined contribution plans, refers to
what an employer puts into the account....
As this Circuit has
observed, "[wihen Congress uses particular language in one section of a
statute and different language in another, we presume its word choice
was intentional."
Id. (citing United States v. Peterson, 394 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2005)). In
Parsons the court stated:
In light of the great similarity that "rate of benefit accrual" bears to the
statutorily defined term "accrued benefit," and the fact that ERISA
requires accrued benefit to be measured as an annual benefit
commencing at normal retirement age for defined benefit plans, but
requires accrued benefit to be measured as the balance of an individual's
account for defined contribution plans, in this court's opinion the term
"rate of benefit accrual," as used in § 204(b)(1)(H)(i), refers to rate
measured as a change in the annual benefit commencing at normal
retirement age. The statute is unambiguous in this respect, and the
court need not inquire further into its meaning.
2006 WL 3826694, at *1 (citing FleetBoston,427 F. Supp. 2d at 164-65).
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formula, whether to have a better ability to budget and control
funding requirements,94 to express the retirement benefit in a
manner that seems to be better appreciated by the average plan
participant, or for any other reason.
Immediately after the
conversion, most employers attempted some sort of mitigation,
but, as should be obvious because the plan designs are not
identical, there is always a chance that some plan participants will
have been better off in the old design before any amendment,
regardless of the employer's attempt at mitigation. These affected
plan participants generally form a litigation class and argue that
the new cash balance design somehow is in violation of the Code,
ERISA, or other federal laws. The authors note that, regardless of
the merits of any individual litigation claim, the employer provides
a qualified retirement plan to its employees on a purely voluntary
basis, and could have terminated the traditional defined benefit
plan95 , which would have caused all plan participants who have
not reached normal retirement age to lose out on some of the
future benefit accruals promised through the plan. In a conversion
to a cash balance plan, especially with some attempt at mitigation,
most participants will fair as well or better in the new plan design
and leave only a minority plaintiff class as the losers. Again,
while the plaintiff class might have our heart-felt sympathies, it is
probably still better to negatively impact a minority of plan
participants in a cash balance plan conversion rather than all of
the plan participants in a plan termination.
There are rules that apply to all qualified defined benefit
plans, and just because a traditional defined benefit is converted
into something that resembles a defined contribution plan, the
rules are still applicable. Many benefits professionals have been
arguing for Congress to look at the full spectrum of defined benefit
plan rules and modify them for hybrid plan designs. Fortunately,
Congress did so in regard to age discrimination, wear-away, and
whipsaw claims when they passed the PPA; unfortunately, they
neglected to amend any other provision.
Since the age
discrimination fix is prospective only for hybrid designs
implemented after June 29, 2005, age discrimination claims for
plans in existence before that threshold date are still relevant.
Statutory provisions that were not amended by the PPA will be

94. The minimum funding rules are detailed in 26 U.S.C. § 412, and require
an enrolled actuary to compare expected plan liabilities to plan assets on an
annual basis and determine the contribution amount required to keep the plan

properly funded, which could result in volatile and unpredictable contribution
targets, especially when interest rates drop.
95. Most defined benefit plans are covered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, the quasi-federal agency that insures retirement promises
delivered through a qualified defined benefit plan, and the termination rules
are described at 29 U.S.C. § 1341.
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fair game for litigation, regardless of whether the cash balance
design was adopted after June 29, 2005.
A. Age Discriminationunder the ADEA"
employment
to
prevent
enacted
The
ADEA was
discrimination based upon age, and the protected class of
employees is those who have attained age forty. The ADEA in
many ways mirrors Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"),
as each shares the common notion of eliminating discrimination in
the workplace. Title VII recognizes a couple of theories of liability
for employment discrimination cases, one being disparate impact.
Disparate impact prohibits certain employment practices that
have only a discriminatory effect upon employees. For a plaintiff
to succeed under a disparate impact theory under Title VII, he
must demonstrate that his employer uses neutral factors in its
decision making process that disproportionately impacts a
protected group. Stated another way, employment practices that
seem fair in form, but are actually discriminatory in operation,
violate Title VII. Due to the similarities between the ADEA and
Title VII, however, it was unclear whether the ADEA also
recognizes the disparate impact theories.
Before the Supreme Court determined that disparate impact
theories are indeed allowed under the ADEA97 , several age
discrimination claims under ADEA were argued in cash balance
plan conversions. The district court of southern Indiana granted
the plan's motion for summary judgment on the issue because it
determined that the Seventh Circuit does not accept the disparate
impact theory," and the First Circuit did not actually decide the
plaintiffs' claims because of procedural reasons, but opined in dicta
that the First Circuit probably would not accept disparate impact
However, in light of the Supreme Court's holding,
theories.'
disparate impact claims for age-discrimination under ADEA are
Congress made similar amendments
absolutely acceptable.
regarding age discrimination under a statutory hybrid plan design
to the ADEA as they did to ERISA and the Code, but they
similarly made those changes prospective only, and the amended
statute does not apply for cash balance plans in operation before
June 29, 2005. Therefore, the field of ADEA age discrimination
claims should be watched closely.

96. Kozak, supra note 5, at 774.
97. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
98. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d 812.
99. Campbell v. BankBoston, NA, 327 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003), affg 206
F. Supp. 2d 70 (D. Mass. 2002).
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Wearaway.°°

No participant's accrued benefit under a qualified defined
benefit plan can ever be reduced due to a plan amendment.' This
restriction applies to the conversion of a traditional defined benefit
plan into a cash balance plan. If the employer does not mitigate
the effect of lost future promised benefits, then the simple rule is
that the participant's hypothetical cash balance account can never
be less than the present value of previously accrued benefits on
the day before the conversion. The wear-away problem occurs
when the method for determining the opening account balances for
all participants produces opening accounts for some of the older
workers that are less than their present values of previously
accrued benefits. Such accounts grow with annual cash balance
and interest credits, but can never be less than the respective
present value of previously accrued benefits. Therefore, it may
take several years under the new cash balance formula for a
participant's cash balance account to exceed the preserved present
value. It is only at that point in time that such a participant will
reap any benefits from the cash balance conversion. In other
words, it may take several years for the preserved present value to
"wear away" And be subsumed by additional accruals in the new
cash balance plan design.
To illustrate this point, assume an employer maintains a
traditional defined benefit plan that promises one percent of
compensation for each year of service. Assume that Employee B,
age sixty, has twenty years of service on December 31, 2006, when
the plan is converted into a cash balance design, and assume
further that the present value of her accrued benefit, based on the
actuarial assumptions stated in the plan document, including a
five percent interest rate, is $150,000. Assume further that the
cash balance plan will provide an allocation of ten percent of
salary plus five percent interest credits, and the method of
determining opening cash balance accounts, whatever it is,
produces an opening balance of $130,000 for Employee B.
Employee B's benefits from the plan, when communicated as a
lump sum, must always be at least $150,000, improved with
interest. Therefore, on January 1, 2007, she is entitled to the
greater of (1) $150,000 or (2) $130,000. Assume that Employee B's
salary is $100,000 for 2007. On December 31, 2007, she is entitled
to the greater of (1) $150,000 times 1.05 (which is $157,500) or (2)
$130,000 times 1.05 plus $10,000 (which is $146,500). Assume
that Employee B's salary is $110,000 for 2008. On December 31,
2008, she is entitled to the greater of (1) $157,500 times 1.05
(which is $165,375) or (2) $146,500 times 1.05 plus $11,000 (which
100. See Kozak, supra note 5, at 771.
101. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(6); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g).
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is $164,825). Assume that Employee B's salary is $115,000 for
2009. On December 31, 2009, she is entitled to the greater of (1)
$165,375 times 1.05 (which is $173,644) or (2) $164,825 times 1.05
plus $11,500 (which is $184,566). Therefore, in this example, it
would take Employee B three years until she actually accrues a
benefit in the cash balance plan design after the conversion that
would increase her preserved accrued benefits from the traditional
defined benefit plan on the day before the conversion. However,
note that in this example Employee B would be sixty-three years
old, and would have earned no benefit accruals between ages sixty
and sixty-three, and even though her account from the cash
balance plan design at age sixty-five will be more than her lump
sum would have been at age sixty-five if the plan had merely been
terminated on December 31, 2006, it will still be less than her
lump sum would have been at age sixty-five if the plan had not
been converted from the traditional defined benefit design.
The problem of wear-away has been eliminated, prospectively,
by the PPA. If a traditional defined benefit plan is converted into a
statutory hybrid plan after June 29, 2005, then the preserved
benefit from the old formula must be added to all new accruals
after the conversion (many refer to this as the traditional A plus B
approach), and cannot be preserved until the new accrued benefit
subsumes the preserved accrued benefit (the traditional wearaway approach).'
Again, since the requirement is for conversions
after the pivotal date of June 29, 2005, with all prior conversions
where wear-away actually occurs plaintiffs can still make an
argument that such wear away is impermissible under the law as
it existed prior to June 29, 2005.
03
C. Whipsaw"

While a participant in a statutory hybrid plan with a cash
balance design is still employed, she is credited with cash balance
credits and interest credits. However, there is a question as to
whether the future interest credits constitute part of the accrued
benefit. In other words, if a participant in a cash balance plan
terminates employment at age fifty, then are the interest credits
that would be added to her account over the next fifteen years
(until normal retirement at age sixty-five) part of her accrued
benefit, even if the participant takes a complete lump sum
distribution at age fifty? One of the requirements of a distribution
that is paid in a form other than a life annuity, is that no portion
of the accrued benefit may be forfeited. Although many employers
concede that future interest credits do constitute part of the
accrued benefit that can never be reduced or taken away, there is
102. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(5)(B)(iii), as amended by the PPA.
103. See Kozak, supra note 5, at 772.
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still no affirmative statutory provision that requires it, and it is
only discussed in non-regulations guidance.'
Also at issue is the calculation of the lump sum payable to a
participant that so elects to receive a lump sum. In a traditional
defined benefit plan, the document expresses the promised
retirement benefits in the form of an annuity starting at normal
retirement age, and it might provide a lump sum as an optional
form of distribution. If a defined benefit plan offers a lump sum
option, then minimum interest rates (commonly referred to as the
"GATT § 417(e) rates") must be used to calculate the minimum
lump sum that must be distributed at any point in time,
Congress added
regardless of the plan's actuarial assumptions.'
the qualified joint and survivor annuity provisions, including this
minimum lump sum distribution amount, in order to make it
easier for working women to participate in pension plans, and to
permit surviving spouses to share in participating workers'
retirement benefits. '1
In a cash balance plan, however, interest credits are part of
the benefit itself, not just a way to express mathematically
equivalent benefit values at different points of time. The IRS
issued guidance that indicated cash balance plans, as defined
benefit plans, must also comply with the discounting rules of
I.R.C. § 417(e). The problem is that if the sponsoring employer
wants to provide interest credits until normal retirement with a
guaranteed rate that is greater than the GATT § 417(e) applicable
interest rate, and then discount to current age using the currently
low GATT rates, then the minimum lump sum distribution that
actually must be paid will be greater than the account balance.
For example, if the employer wants to be benevolent and
guarantee an eight percent interest credit rate on the cash balance
account, and if, according the IRS, the plan is required to discount
the distributions using a lower GATT interest rate, such as 4.68%
for December 2006,"7 then the distribution will be greater than the
M

104. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359.
105. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(25) requires that in order for a defined benefit plan
to provide definitely determinable benefits, the plan's actuarial assumptions
must be stated in the plan document in a manner that precludes employer
discretion. These are the plan's actuarial assumptions, and are used to
determine the value of a lump sum distribution, in lieu of an annual benefit, if
the plan allows that form of distribution. However, when Congress enacted
the qualified plan provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, P.L. 103465 (Dec. 8, 1994), it required that regardless of the plan's actuarial
assumptions, if a lump sum distribution is paid, it must be at least as valuable
as a lump sum calculated with the statutory rates (i.e., GATT rates).
106. David J. Guin, The Retirement Equity Act of 1984: One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back, 37 ALA. L. REV. 163, 172 (1985).
107. The applicable federal rates under 26 U.S.C. § 417(e) are updated and
published monthly in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Many defined benefit
plans, however, include procedures that set the GATT § 417(e) rate in effect in
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hypothetical cash balance account since, mathematically, a lower
discount rate will yield a higher present value. Assume Employee
C is sixty-four years old, and has a cash balance account of
$100,000. If Employee C terminates employment and elects to
receive a lump sum, then, under the IRS rules, the account
balance must be projected to her age sixty-five at the plan's
interest crediting rate of eight percent (i.e., $100,000 times 1.08
(which is $108,000)), but then discounted at the current GATT
§ 417(e) rate of 4.68% (i.e., $108,000 divided by 1.0468 (which is
$103,172)). Therefore, in this case, if Employee C elected a lump
sum distribution at age sixty-four, the plan would be required to
pay her $103,172, even though the account based on the cash
balance formula is only $100,000.
This means that terminated participants taking lump sums
each receive more than their hypothetical cash balance accounts.
Thus, an actuarial loss will occur in the plan that will require
greater contributions from the employer to keep the plan properly
funded for the remaining participants, who will likely cause
further actuarial losses when they terminate employment and
receive their respective lump sum distributions. This phenomenon
is referred to as whipsaw.
To avoid this whipsaw problem,
employers are forced to credit interest using the lower guaranteed
GATT rate rather than a higher rate. This practice avoids
actuarial losses in the plan, but hurts participants who would
have received greater interest credits if the cash balance plan did
not need to comply with the minimum survivor annuity rules. In
the above example, if the cash balance plan document indicated
that interest would be credited at the current prevailing GATT
§ 417(e) rate rather than a locked-in rate of eight percent, then
Employee C's account would be improved and discounted at the
same interest rate and result in a distribution equal to her
hypothetical account balance of $100,000.
The PPA offers relief by providing that as long as the
statutory hybrid plan credits interest at a rate that is no greater
than a floating market rate of return, a reasonable guaranteed
rate of return, or a set formula that determines the greater of a
fixed or variable rate of return, then the plan does not need to
project forward at the plan's interest crediting rate, but discount
at the statutory § 417(e) GATT interest rate. °8 This provision is
effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2006, so
again, cash balance plans in existence prior to 2007 are subject to
litigation that whatever crediting rate that was defined in the plan
the month preceding the current plan year as the single rate that will be used
to determine the minimum present values of accrued benefits for all lump
sums that are distributed during the current plan year.
108. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(5)(B)(i). The IRS has provided some safe harbor
rates in Notice 2007-6, and will likely provide further guidance.
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document violated the mandates of Notice 98-6 that were
controlling until Congress passed the PPA.
D. Excessive Back-Loading

9

One of the characteristics of a traditional defined benefit plan
is the fact that the most valuable benefit accruals occur when a
participant is close to retirement age. This is commonly referred
to as back-loading.
Although Congress acknowledged and
accepted this mathematically absolute back-loading phenomenon,
it included provisions in the statute that limit the amount of backloading allowed in a defined benefit plan design. Congress
provides three methods through which a defined benefit plan can
prove that the accruals are not excessively back-loaded. Either the
plan document provides that accruals will meet the three percent
12
method, 110 the 133 1/3 percent rule"' or the fractional rule.
Since the accrual patterns in a defined contribution plan are frontloaded (or at least ratably-loaded throughout an employee's
career), defined contribution plans do not need to prove that they
are not excessively back-loaded. Cash balance plans, by design,
follow the accrual patterns of a defined contribution plan.
However, cash balance plans, as a form of defined benefit plan,
must satisfy one of the three statutory accrual methods permitted
for all defined benefit plan designs, none of which were drafted to
ensure that a front-loaded plan can provide non-excessive backloading."3 The PPA does not contain any provisions that excuse a
statutory hybrid plan from these three ways of providing accrued
benefits in a manner that does not violate the back loading rules.
Therefore, this issue is ripe for litigation, even in new or newly
converted hybrid plans.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF THE STATUTORY HYBRID PLAN

WITH A CASH BALANCE DESIGN

To summarize, the Seventh Circuit has concluded that the
existing federal law did not render cash balance type plans to be
age-discriminatory, and regardless of the interpretation of that
existing law, Congress has recently blessed these hybrid designs
going forward. So now what? Should every employer adopt a
hybrid cash balance plan? Should every traditional defined benefit
plan be converted into a hybrid type plan? Should all remaining
unions negotiate for hybrid plan designs through the collectively
bargained process?

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Kozak, supra note 5, at 777.
26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A).
26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(B).
26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(C).
See supra note 51.
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Of course not! The world of private sector retirement
programs is still going to be slanted more towards the defined
contribution end of the spectrum than the defined benefit end.
However, hybrid plans still have all of the inherent advantages of
a defined benefit plan, and when promising pension benefits to
employees and delivering them through a defined benefit plan
meets the current and projected business goals of an employer,
then hybrid plan designs should be part of the discussion. Here is
a summary of some of the advantages and some of the
disadvantages of a hybrid design, assuming a defined benefit plan
is the proper plan design.
A. Advantages of Cash Balance Plans
1.

Output Versus Input:
A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, is
designed around output rather than input (even if, for purposes of
age discrimination, the inputs can be tested for compliance).
Therefore, even though a statutory hybrid plan might look like a
defined contribution plan, the limitation is only on annual benefits
paid ($180,000 per year, payable at age sixty-two if the participant
is credited with ten years of participation, actuarially adjusted for
payments at other ages and in other forms, but limited to 100% of
the participant's highest average compensation based on the
highest three consecutive years of pay over all of his years of
service with the employer)."'
The annual contribution, as
discussed below, requires the amount determined by the enrolled
actuary to be deposited and deducted, regardless of its ratio to
total payroll. This differs greatly from a defined contribution plan
where any participant's annual addition is limited ($45,000 per
year, but limited to one hundred percent of his compensation for
the year),"' and where the maximum contribution and deduction
for any year is limited to twenty-five percent of eligible payroll. "6
For this reason, statutory hybrid plans are still a good way to
provide older participants with an adequate retirement benefit
because a large account (or high accumulated percentage of final
average compensation) can be funded in a few years to provide the
maximum annual benefit, or at least a substantial benefit;
whereas, a defined contribution plan is always limited to an
114. 26 U.S.C. § 415(b). The statutory dollar limit of $160,000 is adjusted
annually for cost of living adjustments, and is $180,000 for 2007. The PPA
clarifies that average compensation for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 415(b) is for all
years of service with the employer, and is not limited to years of participation
in the plan after it is adopted.
115. 26 U.S.C. § 415(c). The statutory dollar limit of $40,000 is adjusted
annually for cost of living adjustments, and is $45,000 for 2007.
116. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3).
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allocation of $45,000 per year, whatever that accumulates to in a
few years when the employee retires.
2.

Sweeteners

A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, is
simply a mix of promises that need to be funded. In certain
situations, the sponsoring employer might want to increase the
level of benefits to take advantage of unexpected business profits,
to encourage older employees to retire early with permanent or
temporary subsidized early retirement benefits, to provide benefits
for service earned by a predecessor employer or for periods before
the plan was effective, or to enhance the benefits for selected
employees who lose out on pension benefits from their former
employer when they come work for this employer. All of these
sweeteners are permitted in defined benefit plans, but are
prohibited in defined contribution plans. Since many of these
situations come up from time to time without much warning, an
employer can take advantage of its options if it maintains a
statutory hybrid plan. It seems that the advantages of a statutory
hybrid plan over traditional defined benefit plans is that the
hypothetical account (or accumulated percentage of final average
salary) can be readily evident and appreciated by the employees
who are provided the sweeteners.
3. Funding
A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, needs
to comply with annual funding requirements." 7 The new funding
rules require that if the present value of accrued benefits as of the
beginning of the year is fully funded, then the only required
contribution is the present value of benefits expected to accrue
during the year. If the plan is not fully funded at the beginning of
the year, then the required contribution also includes the payment
of a seven-year amortization of the shortfall. This is further
complicated if the plan is at risk,"8 which results in more
conservative assumptions as to when employees will retire and
what optional forms of benefit they will select, a four percent
increase in the values of the Present Values, and an additional
surcharge per participant, which is the payment of a seven-year
amortization of a $700 per participant load. Therefore, in a
statutory hybrid plan that expresses the accumulated benefit as a
117. After the PPA, the concept of a minimum funding standard account is
eliminated, and is replaced with a required annual contribution calculated by
the enrolled actuary under the provisions of new 26 U.S.C. § 430 or § 431.
118. After the PPA rules are effective, a plan will basically be at risk "this
year" if the ratio of liabilities to assets "last year" was less than seventy
percent and eighty percent (the liabilities need to be calculated in two
different ways).
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hypothetical account, the present value of accrued benefits at the
beginning of the year is simply the total value of hypothetical
accounts at the beginning of the year, and if the plan assets can
cover all accounts, then the required contribution for the year is
simply the present value of benefits accruing during the year (i.e.,
the value of all accrual and interest credits for the year as defined
in the plan document). If the plan is slightly underfunded, but not
at risk, then the required contribution will include a seven-year
amortization of the shortfall. If the plan has more than five
hundred participants, and if it is at risk, then the contribution will
require a load. Unfortunately this can get complicated, but if the
plan is adequately funded, then the contributions are predictable
and controllable. In addition, if the plan is properly funded and
the employer has discretionary income, it can contribute and
deduct about fifty percent more of the required contribution as a
cushion amount (to act as a credit to stave off unexpectedly large
contributions that might be required in the future).
4. Investment of PlanAssets
A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, needs
to utilize an investment strategy that makes sense. Under the
new PPA rules, an applicable defined benefit plan can use a
market rate of return. For other reasons, since Notice 96-8 was
issued, most cash balance plans had been crediting interest at the
applicable interest rate under I.R.C. § 417(e).Once the Department
of Treasury tells us what Congress means by a market rate of
return, many existing statutory hybrid plans will simply be
amended to substitute that market rate for the applicable rate.1 9
However, the new rules also allow a guaranteed fixed rate without
the need to pay lump sums calculated under the I.R.C. § 417(e)
rates, even if greater than the hypothetical account. This will
allow some plan sponsors to offer what looks like a defined
contribution plan, but which has a guaranteed rate of interest,
thus preserving the investment risk with the employer and not
passing it on to the participants. This floating market rate, or a
fixed rate, will really allow employers to invest the assets in a
manner that often times will match the promised rate, thus
avoiding the funding issues stated above. The only concern, after
regulations are issued, is whether investing assets to tie into what
the Department of Treasury believes is a good market rate of
return will comply with the fiduciary requirements of prudence
and diversification of plan assets in order to minimize the risk of

119. Some safe harbors have been described in Notice 2007-6, pending
further guidance.
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large losses.12 ° Hopefully the Department of Labor will see eye-toeye with the Department of Treasury.
5.

Top Heavy

A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, needs
to comply with the accelerated vesting and minimum accrual rules
121
in any year that the plan is determined to be top heavy.
However, under the PPA, all statutory hybrid plans after 2008
must fully vest participants after three years of service. 2' This
new mandatory vesting schedule satisfies the "top heavy" rules,"'
so it no longer matters whether a statutory hybrid plan is top
heavy when it comes to vesting schedules. As to the minimum
accrued benefit of two percent of average compensation for each4
year of participation that the plan is top heavy (up to 10 years),
if the statutory hybrid plan is part of a combined program, and
employees participate in both the defined contribution plan and
the statutory hybrid plan, then the top heavy minimum allocations
should probably be provided in the defined contribution plan. If,
however, the employee only participates in a statutory hybrid
plan, then the plan must be designed to comply with the "top
heavy" rules in any year it is top heavy. However, as described
below, every participant will be credited with at least a half
percent of compensation for each year of service to satisfy the
minimum participation requirements, so any additional credits
required to satisfy the requirements for non-key employees in top
heavy years is probably not excessively costly.
6. Combining a Statutory Hybrid Plan with a Cash or Deferred
Arrangement
Currently, a cash or deferred arrangement ("CODA") (i.e., a
401(k) plan with elective salary deferrals) is only allowed to be
part of a profit sharing plan.' Starting in 2010, however, a CODA
can be paired with a defined benefit plan"6 to form what is
commonly referred to as a "DB(k) Plan," which will be treated as a
single plan for reporting and disclosure purposes. What better
way to marry the advantages of a defined benefit plan with the
advantages of a defined contribution plan than with a defined
benefit plan with accounts that can harmonize with the CODA
This type of design, however, will be limited to
accounts?
120. The Department of Labor has jurisdiction over the fiduciary rules
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
121. 26 U.S.C. § 416.
122. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(13)(B), as amended by the PPA.
123. 26 U.S.C. § 416(b).
124. 26 U.S.C. § 416(c)(1).
125. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(1).

126. 26 U.S.C. § 414(x)(2), as amended by the PPA.
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employers with less than five hundred employees. 127 If a statutory
hybrid plan is paired with a CODA, then the pay credit must be at
least two percent if the participant's age at the beginning of the
year is thirty, four percent from ages thirty-one to thirty-nine, six
percent from ages forty to forty-nine, and eight percent if age fifty
or older (thus, a DB(k) plan will always satisfy the top heavy
minimum benefit accrual rules).'28 In the CODA portion, the new
automatic contribution arrangement rules must be utilized, and
the employer must match at least fifty percent of the elective
deferrals up to four percent of compensation. 129
Employer
contributions from both portions of the combined plan must be
fully vested within three years of credited service, and all
contributions and benefits, 3 ' and all other rights and features
must be provided on a uniform basis to all participants."' For
purposes of the Form 5500, the combined plan arrangement
constitutes a single plan.
7. In Service Distributionsand PhasedRetirement
Currently, all defined benefit plans are prohibited from
distributing plan benefits to participants that are still actively
employed (other than through a qualified plan loan). The PPA will
permit defined benefit plans to allow in-service distributions upon
the attainment of age sixty-two, 132 once the Department of
Treasury provides guidance through regulations. This provision
ties in with the concept of phased retirement. In a statutory
hybrid plan design, whether the accrued benefit is expressed as a
hypothetical account or as an accumulated percentage of final
average salary, the in-service distribution portion will be an
obvious reduction in the value of the account or in the
accumulated percentage; whereas, in a traditional defined benefit
plan design, the balance between benefits being taken during
phased retirement and the benefits remaining after total
termination of employment are sometimes not as obvious.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

26
26
26
26
26
26

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 414(x)(2)(A)(iv).
§ 414(x)(2)(B)(iii).
§ 414(x)(2)(C)(i)(II).
§ 414(x)(2)(D).
§ 414(x)(2)(E).
§ 401(a)(36), as amended by the PPA.
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B. Disadvantagesof Cash Balance Plans"
1.

Minimum Participation

A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, needs
to comply with the additional participation rules1 4 and must
benefit at least fifty employees, or if less, forty percent of the
employees (however, if there is more than one employee, then the
cash balance plan must always benefit at least two employees). In
order to count as benefiting under a hybrid plan, each participant
used in this number count must accrue at least a half percent of
compensation for each year of participation, and additionally,
cannot be a short-service or part time employee if other longerservice or full time employees are not participating in the defined
benefit plan."'
2. PBGC Premiums
A statutory hybrid plan, like most defined benefit plans,
needs to pay annual premiums to the PBGC if it is a covered
plan.'
Under the new rules, even if the plan is fully funded, it
will still need to pay thirty dollars per participant as a premium,
and if not fully funded, then an additional variable premium.
Generally, defined benefit plans that only cover owners and their
spouses, or that are sponsored by a professional corporation with
less than twenty-five employees, are not covered by the PBGC.
3. EnrolledActuary
A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, needs
to have an enrolled actuary certify its funded status on an annual
basis, and under the new PPA rules, will also need to certify
whether it is at risk.'37 Although some employers that do not
currently sponsor any type of defined benefit plan might view this
as an additional administrative expense, at least a competent and
qualified professional is required to review the funded status of
the plan and consult with the sponsor on an annual basis.
4. Limitations on Lump Sum Distributions
A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, might
not be able to pay out lump sums (i.e., the participant's
hypothetical account if the plan expresses the accrued benefit as
133. Please note that the authors are big advocates of defined benefit plans,
so although the disadvantages are important to consider, they are oftentimes
obstacles that can be overcome in a good defined benefit plan design.
134. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(26).
135. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(26)-3(c)(2).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1321.
137. 26 U.S.C. § 412, generally, before and after being amended by the PPA.
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an account). Under the PPA rules, if the funded percentage is
between sixty percent and eighty percent then the lump sum will
be limited to the lesser of the PBGC guaranteed payment or fifty
percent of the hypothetical account. The PPA does not seem to
eliminate the existing provision in Treasury regulations that
restrict lump sum distributions to the top twenty-five paid
employees if the plan is funded at less than one hundred and ten
percent of current liability (which has no meaning after 2008),' 38 so
we need to see what the Department of Treasury does with those
regulations.
5. No Wear-Away on Plan Conversions
A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, can be
terminated, or can be converted into a different type of defined
benefit plan. Under the PPA, however, if a traditional defined
benefit plan is converted into an applicable defined benefit plan,
then the preserved benefit must be added to all new accruals after
the conversion (the traditional A plus B approach), and cannot be
preserved until the new accrued benefit subsumes the preserved
accrued benefit (the traditional wear-away approach).'39
6.

QualifiedJoint and Survivor Annuity

A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, must
pay a "Qualified Pre-Retirement Survivor Annuity" to the
surviving spouse of any married participant that dies before
attaining "Normal Retirement Date," and must pay a "Qualified
Joint and Survivor Annuity" to any married participant upon
attaining his or her "Annuity Starting Date," unless the spouse
agrees to an alternate form of benefit."40 Under the new PPA rules,
the QJSA options have become slightly more complicated, and
every pension plan will need to add a seventy-five percent "Joint
and Survivor Annuity" option ("J&S option") if it does not already
include that option (or does not at least offer the choice between a
fifty percent J&S option and a one hundred percent J&S option)."'
In order to mitigate problems in a hybrid plan design when an
annuity will be paid instead of a lump sum, the plan documents
can be written in a manner that mandates that the plan use the
hypothetical account balance or the accumulated percentage of
final average compensation to purchase the necessary annuity
from an insurance company.

138. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(4)-5(b)(3).

139. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(5)(B)(iii).
140. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(11).
141. 26 U.S.C. § 417(g), as amended by the PPA.
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7. Normal Retirement Age
A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, must
specify a "Normal Retirement Age," not only for "Annuity Starting
Date" purposes, but for full vesting and accrual purposes as well.'42
Based on proposed Treasury regulations on phased retirement and
some recent litigation in the Southern District of New York, the
normal retirement age in a statutory hybrid plan might be more
restrictive
than a normal retirement age in a defined contribution
43
plan.

8. Back-Loading
A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, must
meet one of three statutory accrued benefit provisions to avoid
excessive back-loading. T'
Although the provisions of the PPA
seem to indicate that cash balance plans do not violate age
discrimination prohibitions if the accrued benefit for any
participant is not less than the accrued benefit for a similarly
situated participant that is younger, 4 5 there are no amendments to
the statutory anti-back-loading rules. Unfortunately, some court
opinions might become relevant.14
9. ProtectedAccrued Benefits in a Conversion
A statutory hybrid plan, like all defined benefit plans, cannot
be amended in a way that has the effect of eliminating or reducing
an early retirement benefit or a retirement-type subsidy, or
eliminating an optional form of benefit.1 47 Before the PPA, several
courts determined that the conversion from a traditional defined
benefit plan into a cash balance plan improperly excluded early
retirement benefits or subsidies protected under the old plan."
142. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(8).
143. See Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 448 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (rejecting PWC's motion to dismiss, and allowing the Plaintiffs to argue
that the normal retirement age in the PWC plan violates ERISA).
144. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1).
145. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(5)(A).
146. In Esden v. Ret. Plan of First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1061 (2001), the court opined in dicta, since
the plaintiffs apparently did not argue it at the lower court and were refused
to amend their complaint, that this particular plan's interest crediting rate
might not comply with any of the three accrued benefit rules under 26 U.S.C.
§ 411(b)(1) (including the 133 1/3% rule). In the original case, Cooper v. IBM
PersonalPension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 2003), the lower court
determined that IBM's contention that its cash balance plan design complied
with the fractional rule was a matter of fact to be proven, but after that
decision denying the plan's motion for summary judgment, IBM and the
plaintiffs settled on all issues except for the ERISA age discrimination claim,
which was ultimately rejected by the Seventh Circuit.
147. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(6).
148. See Esden, 229 F.3d 154; Berger v. Xerox, 338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2003).
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The PPA clears this up and requires that the preserved benefit
before the conversion must include all early retirement benefits
and retirement-type subsidies if at the time of conversion the
participant has met the age, years of service, and other
requirements.
CONCLUSION

Returning once again to the central issue around which this
Article is oriented-age discrimination issues in cash balance
arrangements-the authors conclude by stating their belief that
good news for cash balance plans is good news for America's
retirement system, and that while the PPA and some federal
courts have put the issue mostly to bed, the authors regard the
pockets of potential liability that still exist to be an unfortunate
circumstance.
The authors have not adopted a pro-cash balance plan
position arbitrarily. Rather, they regard Congress's endorsement
of this plan type, like the aforementioned DB(k) Plan, as an
overdue step to help reinvigorate the defined benefit plan market
that has been languishing (and slowly dying) in the shackles of
Lawmakers have certainly become
overly-rigid regulation.
cognizant of the fact that voluntary 401(k)s, for all of their
advantages, are not an adequate stand-alone solution for providing
retirement income for America's aging workforce, especially in
light of the uncertain future of the Social Security system and the
existence of historically low personal savings rates.
Defined benefit plans are a good and powerful weapon in the
fight against the poverty of the aged, and while hybrid
arrangements may not be as ideal of a solution as traditional plans
could be, it is clear at this point that regulatory endorsement of
only a narrow class of traditional plan types has been a factor in
the slow death of defined benefit plans in general. And to the
extent that lawmakers fail to protect plan sponsors from
creatively-drafted lawsuits that attempt to capitalize on nuances
of language and unintended "black-letter-only" prohibitions, it is a
weapon we should expect to do without. The authors very much
hope that Congress and the various regulatory bodies continue to
try and find middle ground with employers by permitting (albeit
cautiously) new and more flexible defined benefit plan breeds to
better improve the outlook for generations of future retirees.

